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Abstract— Most of the security threats in relational database 
applications have their source in client-side systems when they 
issue requests formalized by Create, Read, Update and Delete 
(CRUD) expressions. If tools such as ODBC and JDBC are used 
to develop business logics, then there is another source of threats. 
In some situations the content of data sets retrieved by Select 
expressions can be modified and then committed into the host 
databases. These tools are agnostic regarding not only database 
schemas but also regarding the established access control 
policies. This situation can hardly be mastered by programmers 
of business logics in database applications with many and 
complex access control policies. To overcome this gap, we extend 
the basic Role-Based Access policy to support and supervise the 
two sources of security threats. This extension is then used to 
design the correspondent RBAC model. Finally, we present a 
software architectural model from which static RBAC 
mechanisms are automatically built, this way relieving 
programmers from mastering any schema. We demonstrate 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of our proposal from a use 
case based on Java and JDBC. 
Keywords— RBAC; access control; information security; 
software architecture; distributed systems; middleware; databases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Information systems, including the ones of telecommunication 
operators, are traditionally protected by several security 
measures, among them we emphasize: user authentication, 
secure connections and data encryption. Another relevant 
security measure is access control [1][2], which “is concerned 
with limiting the activity of legitimate users.” [3]. In other 
words, access control regulates every users’ requests to access 
sensitive resources, in our case data stored in relational 
database management systems (RDBMS). Most of these 
requests are from users running client applications that need to 
access data. When client applications, and mainly business 
logics, are built from tools such as ODBC [4], JDBC [5], 
ADO.NET [6], LINQ [7], JPA [8] and Hibernate [9], users’ 
requests can be materialized through several techniques 
provided by those tools (herein known as access modes). Two 
of them are the most popular and, therefore, widely used: 
requests based on Create, Read, Update and Delete (CRUD) 
expressions encoded inside strings (this is the Direct Access 
Mode) and requests trigged when content of local data sets 
(LDS) retrieved by Select expressions are modified and 
committed to the host database (this is the Indirect Access 
Mode). Figure 1 presents a typical usage of JDBC. Similarly 
to the other tools, JDBC is agnostic regarding the schema of 
databases and also regarding the schema of access control 
mechanisms. Programmers can write any CRUD expression 
(line 100) and execute it (line 100-103). In this case it is a 
Select expression and, therefore, a LDS is instantiated (line 
103). Once again, programmers can read attributes (line 
105,106), update rows (line108-110), insert new rows (line 
112-115) and, finally, delete rows (line 117). After being 
committed, these update, insert and delete protocols are 
replicated in the host database. There is no possibility to make 
programmers aware of any established schemas (database and 
access control policies). In situations where database schemas 
and/or security policies are complex, programmers can hardly 
write source in accordance with     the established security 
policies. To overcome this situation we propose an extension 
to basic Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) policy [10], 
which has emerged as one of the dominant access control 
policies [11]. In our proposed model, a role comprises the 
required security information to supervise the direct and the 
indirect access modes. Through this security information and 
from a software architectural model, to be herein   presented, 
security  components  are  automatically  built  to statically 
enforce     the     established     RBAC     policies. This     way, 
 
 
Figure 1. Typical usage of JDBC. 
programmers are relieved from mastering any schema. 
This paper is organized as follows: section II presents the 
related work; section III presents our conceptual proposal; 
section IV presents our implementation proposal; section V 
discusses some aspects of the presented solution and, finally, 
section VI presents the conclusion. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Chlipala et al. [12] present a tool, Ur/Web, that allows 
programmers to write statically-checkable access control 
policies as CRUD expressions. Basically, each policy 
determines which data is accessible. Then, programs are 
written and checked to assure that data involved in CRUD 
expressions is accessible through some policy. To allow 
policies to vary by user, queries use actual data and a new 
extension to the standard SQL to capture ‘which secrets the 
user knows’. This extension is based on a predicate referred to 
as ´known’ used to model which information users are already 
aware of to decide upon the information to be disclosed. The 
validation process takes place at compile time, this way not 
relieving programmers from mastering database schemas and 
security policies while writing source code. 
Abramov et al. [13] present a complete framework that 
allows security aspects to be defined early in the software 
development process and not at the end. They present a model 
from which access control policies can be inferred and 
applied. Nevertheless, similarly to [12], the validation process 
takes place only at compile time, this way entailing 
programmers to master the established access control policies.  
Zarnett et al. [14] present a different solution, which can 
be applied to control the access to methods of remote objects 
via Java RMI [15]. The server that hosts the remote objects 
uses Java Annotations to enrich methods and classes with 
metadata about the roles to be authorized to use them. Then, 
RMI Proxy Objects are generated in accordance with the 
established access control policies (they contain the authorized 
methods only). Fischer et al. [16] present a more fine-grained 
access control, which uses parameterized Annotations to 
assign roles to methods. These approaches, in contrast with 
our concept, do not facilitate the access to a relational 
database because the developers still need to have full 
knowledge of the database schema and also the authorized 
accesses to database objects. 
A similar approach was presented by Ahn et al. [17], 
where a tool is used to generate, from a security model, source 
code to check if there is any security violation. The 
verification process takes place only after writing the source 
code, this way not addressing the key aspects of our work.  
There are other works related to access control: a 
distributed enforcement of the RBAC policies is proposed by 
Komlenovic et al. in [18]; a new technique and a tool to find 
errors in the RBAC policies are presented by Jayaraman et al. 
in  [19] and, finally, Wallach et al. in [20] propose new 
semantics for stack inspection that addresses concerns with the 
traditional stack inspection, which is used to determine if a 
dangerous call (e.g. to the file system) is allowed. Our work 
complements these, regarding the access to relational 
databases, by generating static access control mechanisms 
automatically and accordingly with the established RBAC 
policies, this way relieving programmers from mastering 
them. 
The works presented in [21][22] deal with the direct and 
the indirect access modes, but none of them is focused on how 
to enforce RBAC policies based on CRUD expressions. The 
work presented in [22]  can be seen as the first step to achieve 
the objectives of the work presented in this paper. Basically, it 
deals with CRUD expressions and both access modes but does 
not address how to relate CRUD expressions and policies 
based on RBAC. The work presented in [22] also leverages 
[21] but it is mainly focused on addressing a different security 
key aspect: the enforcement of access control policies to the 
runtime values used on the direct and on the indirect access 
modes. 
III. OUR PROPOSAL: CONCEPTUAL PERSPECTIVE 
Access control is usually implemented in a three phase 
approach [1]: security policy definition, security model to be 
followed and security enforcement mechanisms. The 
organization of this section is also organized in three sub-
sections, each one addressing one implementation phase. 
A. RBAC Policy 
In this sub-section we present an extension to the basic RBAC 
policy that is used to supervise requests to access data stored 
in Relational Database Systems (RDBMS). The extension is 
aimed at defining new properties to be supported by RBAC 
policies. Traditionally, among other concepts, RBAC policies 
comprise: users, roles (they can be hierarchized), permissions, 
delegations and actions. Basically, legitimate (authenticated) 
users can only execute some action if he has been authorized 
to play the role that rules that action. At the end, actions are 
the four main operations on database objects (tables and 
views): read, insert, update and delete. Depending on the 
granularity, these actions can be defined at the level of 
database objects, at the level of columns, at the level of rows 
and at the level of cells.  There are several approaches to 
authorize or deny these actions, among them: constraints can 
be defined directly on database objects and also by using 
query re-writing techniques. In our case actions are formalized 
by what can be done on the direct and on the indirect access 
modes. In other words, actions are the CRUD expressions that 
can be used and also the operations that can be done on LDS. 
The granularity of the direct access mode is defined by each 
CRUD expression. The granularity of the indirect access mode 
must be defined at the protocol level (read, insert, update and 
delete) and also at the attribute level (except for the delete 
protocol, which is always at the row level). The granularity at 
LDS level provides a full control to define which protocols are 
to be made available. This granularity when combined with 
the granularity at the attribute level provides, for each LDS, 
the full control to define which attributes are to be made 
available for each protocol. In terms of cardinality, each role 
comprises a set of un-ordered CRUD expressions. 
B. RBAC Model 
In this sub-section we present a model to formalize the 
extension presented to the RBAC policy. The extension can be 
formalized by several approaches, depending on the practical 
scenarios where they are going to be used. The model herein 
presented is tailored to scenarios where a tool is available to 
help and minimize the effort in defining the policies to be 
enforced. We start by analyzing CRUD expressions because 
every access to data starts through the direct access mode and 
only then the indirect access mode can be used (only with 
Select expressions). Each CRUD expression type (Select, 
Insert, Update and Delete) can be expressed by general 
schemas but each individual CRUD expression is represented 
by specializing one of the general schemas. During the 
assessment we made to Call Level Interfaces (CLI), in which 
JDBC is included, we found out that the schema of each 
expression type can be built from a small set of smaller 
schemas. The functionalities expressed by the smaller schemas 
are: only Select expressions return relations; all CRUD 
expressions types can use runtime values for clause 
conditions; some CRUD expressions return the number of 
affected rows (Insert, Update and Delete) and, finally, some 
CRUD expressions use runtime values for column values 
(Insert and Update). We can also elicit other perspectives for 
LDS, such as some LDS are scrollable (there are no 
restrictions on choosing which row is the next selected row) 
while others are forward-only (only the next row can be 
selected). To address this bundle of different smaller schemas, 
the schema needs to be flexible and adaptable. This challenge 
is addressed through the design of entities, herein referred to 
as Business Schemas. Business Schemas are responsible for 
hiding the actual direct and indirect access modes and also for 
providing new direct and indirect access modes driven by 
access control policies. Additionally, after some research we 
came up to the conclusion that the relationship between 
Business Schemas and CRUD expressions is many to many. 
This means that one Business Schema can manage one or 
more CRUD expressions and one CRUD expression can be 
managed by one or more Business Schemas. Now we give one 
example for each case.  Let us consider the next two Select 
expressions: 
1) Select * from table; 
2) Select * from table where col>10; 
First we analyze the direction “one Business Schema -> many 
CRUD expressions”. From the direct access mode 
perspective, there is no difference between the two 
expressions. Both are Select and both have zero runtime 
values. Additionally, the schema of the returned relations is 
equal in both cases. Then, the same Business Schema can be 
shared by both expressions if the security policy to be applied 
on the indirect access mode is the same for both cases. Now 
we analyze the direction “one CRUD expression -> many 
Business Schemas”. This case is simpler to explain. We can 
use any of the two Select expressions. In cases where different 
security policies are applied to the same Select expression, 
then we can use it in in more than one Business Schema. For 
example, the same CRUD expression is managed by two 
Business Schemas where the updated protocol is provided 
only in one of them. Finally, Figure 2 presents the general 
extension to be included in concrete RBAC models. This 
extension does not need to be exactly as presented. The only 
important issues are the relationships and cardinalities 
between roles, Business Schemas and CRUD expressions. By 
this  we  mean  that  it  is not compulsory to keep them 
adjacent as presented. Other entities can be included between 
them. Moreover, the policies to be followed to authorize or not 
to authorize roles are also out of scope of this paper. It is up to 
the security expert to decide the granting and the denying 
models to be followed. 
 
Role BusinessSchema CRUD* * * *
 
Figure 2. Extension for the RBAC model. 
 
C. Software Architectural Model 
In this sub-section we present the software architectural 
model, shown in Figure 3, for building the enforcement 
mechanisms from the extended RBAC model. The presented 
architectural model represents the implementation of one role. 
It is up to each system architect to decide how to expand it to 
support several roles. Moreover, it is focused on how to 
implement RBAC mechanisms and not how to build complete 
and feasible implementations. For example, the architectural 
model does not address key issues such as the scrolling policy 
on LDS and database transactions. These and other issues are 
out of the architectural model context. We start by describing 
the Business Schema interface, herein known as 
IBusinessSchema, which is the most complex entity. From it 
we will present and describe the architectural model. This 
interface, as we can infer from what has been already 
presented, needs to cope with the two access modes. The 
functionalities to be provided depend mainly on the CRUD 
expressions type and on the necessary runtime values. This is 
translated into the architectural model this way: 
IBusinessSchema extends two interfaces IDAC (direct access 
mode) e IIAM (indirect access mode). 
 
IDAC 
This interface manages the direct access mode. Depending on 
the type of CRUD expressions and on the runtime values, it 
can extend 1, 2 or 3 interfaces: 
 IExecute - This interface is mandatory.  It is 
responsible for the execution of CRUD expressions 
of any type and also for setting the runtime values for 
clause conditions. 
 ISet – This interface is used with Insert and Update 
expressions when there is the need to set runtime 
values for columns. 
 IRows – This interface is used only with Update, 
Insert and Delete  expressions  to  notify  applications 
about the number of affected rows. 
IIAM 
This interface manages the indirect access mode. Depending 
on the mechanisms to be implemented, it can extend at most 
four interfaces: 
 IRead – This interface is mandatory. It can comprise 
services to read any sub-set of attributes of returned 
relations. 
 IUpdate – This interface is only available if the 
established access control policies authorize the  
 
attributes of LDS to be updated. In this case, only the 
updatable attributes can be updated. 
 IInsert - This interface is only available if the 
established access control policies authorize the 
insertion of new rows on LDS. In this case, only the 
insertable attributes can be inserted. 
 IDelete – This interface is only available if the 
established access control policies authorize the rows 
of LDS to be deleted. 
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Figure 3. Software architectural model for one role. 
 
Regarding  the  relation  between  Business  Schemas  and, 
Roles and CRUD expressions, we can see  from Figure 3  that 
the architectural model is consistent with the RBAC model.  
Please remember that the architectural model represents the 
implementation of one role only. The model says that one role 
comprises one or more Business Schemas and each Business 
Schema comprises one or more CRUD expressions. From the 
presented architectural model and also from the RBAC model, 
security components can be automatically built, see Figure 4. 
To achieve this goal, a tool is necessary to  automate   the  
process. It   is   not   part   of   our proposal but the tool is a 
key component to transform modeled RBAC policies into 
security components. 
 
Security 
Component
+ RBAC modelArchitectural model
Automated tool
 
Figure 4. Automated building process of security components. 
IV. OUR PROPOSAL: IMPLMENTATION PERSPECTIVE 
In this section we present our implementation perspective, 
which consists of several different components, as shown in 
Figure 5. The Policy Server is a relational database that 
contains a realization of the proposed extension to the RBAC 
model. The Policy Extractor is an automated tool responsible 
for building automatically Security Data Structures aimed at 
conveying to programmers awareness of the established 
policies. These data structures are built from data extracted 
from the Policy Server and also from the software 
architectural model. They are responsible for relieving 
programmers from mastering  any  database  schema  and  any 
RBAC policy while they are writing source code. The Security 
Layer is responsible   for   implementing   the   access   control 
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Figure 5. Proposed implementation architecture. 
mechanisms. It comprises a component, herein known as the 
Security Engine, that builds the mechanisms at runtime from 
Policy Server and also from the software architectural model. 
These mechanisms (instances of classes that implement 
Business Schemas) effectively control users’ requests, at 
runtime, when they issue requests through the direct and the 
indirect access modes. 
A. Policy Server 
The Policy Server contains a realization of the proposed 
extension (shown in Figure 2) for a simplified RBAC model, 
see Figure 6. Our model uses some of the most relevant 
features of RBAC models: subjects (users), applications, 
sessions, permissions and delegations. A user can play role 
only if that role is explicitly authorized (permitted or 
delegated) to him when he is running a session of an 
application. Permissions and delegations can be dynamically 
modified at runtime. CRUD expressions are kept in Crd_crud 
and Business Schemas and are stored as Java interfaces (based 
on the architectural model) in Bus_BusinessSchema. This 
method of storage is not mandatory. Business Schemas can be 
represented in any other metadata model. 
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Figure 6. Simplified security model. 
 
B. Policy Extractor 
In this subsection we will present the Policy Extractor, which 
is responsible for building automatically the Security Data 
Structures to convey a complete awareness of the security 
mechanisms to programmers. We have implemented two 
different Policy Extractors: one as a standalone application 
and other based on Java annotations. Independently from the 
used technique, programmers are always provided with the 
same Security Data Structures. In our implementation, 
Security Data Structures are Java interfaces that formalize 
roles and mechanisms to be implemented on both direct and 
indirect access modes. Figure 7 shows the data structures for a 
role identified by Role_IRole_B1 (line 7). This role is defined 
as a Java interface, as previously mentioned, that extends the 
role Role_IRole_A. We use this Java property to allow 
hierarchization of roles. Beyond extending the role 
Role_IRole_A,  Role_IRole_B1 comprises two Business 
Schemas: i_orders (9-10) and s_customers (15-16). The first 
Business Schema manages one CRUD expression identified 
by  i_orders_I_Orders_withCustomerID  (line 11-12)  and  the 
second manages s_customers_S_Customer_all (line 17-18). 
Again, these Business Schemas are formalized through Java 
interfaces. From these data structures (some not explicitly 
shown) programmers write source code as the one shown in 
Figure 8. From this figure we can see that the Business 
Schema Role_IRole_B1.s_customers is instantiated for a user 
playing the role  B1   (line 53). The   CRUD   expression   is 
selected by selecting one of t hose  supported  by  the  selected 
Business Schemas (line 54). In this case the CRUD expression 
is identified by the integer 
Role_IRole_B1.s_customers_S_Customers_all. A runtime 
value is set for a clause condition (line 55) and the CRUD   
expression   is  executed   (line 55) (this  is  the  direct access 
mode). Programmers continue to be aware of the policies on 
the indirect access  mode  level  (line 56-68).  Some   readable,  
 
 
Figure 7. Implemented security data structures. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Environment conveyed to programmers. 
 
Figure 9. Example of Figure 1 based on our proposal. 
 
updatable (with prefix u) and insertable (with prefix i) 
attributes are shown. As a final note, in our implementation, 
CRUD expressions are identified by integers, this way hiding 
information about database schemas. This aspect can be very 
relevant in critical database applications where schemas of 
databases need to be hidden. CRUD expressions only exist at 
the level of Security Layers. 
Finally, Figure 9 shows the example presented in Figure 1 but 
now based on our proposal. Unlike Figure 1, now 
programmers are completely aware of constraints enforced by 
mechanisms, being relieved from mastering any schema. 
C. Security Layer 
Our security layer comprises three sub-components: 1) a 
general manager, which is responsible for providing client 
applications with standard interfaces to access internal 
functionalities; 2) security engine, which is responsible for 
building at runtime the necessary access control mechanisms, 
always in accordance with the established policies to the 
running user and, finally, 3) the implemented mechanisms, 
which comprise: classes that implement Business Schemas 
and also the authorized CRUD expressions. Unlike Security 
Data Structures, these mechanisms implement the necessary 
source code to supervise requests issued through both access 
modes. If any mismatch exists between what users want to 
request and the implemented policies, runtime exceptions are 
raised. In our implementation, security layers provide generic 
type safe methods to allow application tiers to instantiate 
Business Schemas and execute CRUD expressions, see Figure 
8 (line 53-54). These methods look up in local libraries for the 
requested Business Schemas and CRUD expressions and, if 
found, classes that implement the requested Business Schemas 
are instantiated through reflection. If they are not found, it 
means that that user, for some security reason, is no more 
authorized to play that role. In this case an exception is raised. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
The approach herein presented was successfully evaluated 
against the objective initially defined. There are other relevant 
issues that also deserve to be discussed, although they are not 
key aspects of this work. As such, a brief description is 
presented about eight different aspects: scalability, 
maintainability, autonomic computing, configurability, 
usability, applicability, separation of concerns and 
trustworthy. 
Scalability: Unlike several other approaches, the authorization 
processes are completely distributed, this way avoiding any 
scalability problem. 
Maintainability: Security layers are automatically built and 
updated. This is clearly different from what happens with 
other approaches where maintenance activities are required at 
the level of client systems whenever modifications occur at 
the level of business logics.  
Autonomic Computing: An autonomic system is characterized 
by making decisions on its own. It permanently checks the 
context and, based on policies, it automatically adapts itself. 
Our proposal is not an autonomic system but systems based on 
our proposal are easily integrated in autonomic systems. An 
autonomic system prepared to detect situations where policies 
need to be dynamically adapted can use our proposal to 
dynamically adapt the implemented mechanisms.  
Configurability: The configuration process of metadata is 
substantially automated if an enhanced tool similar to the one 
presented in [20][21] is used. The new tool would 
automatically create the required metadata from CRUD 
expressions. Moreover, the tool could also automate the 
process to obtain the basic metadata to access databases on a 
table basis as O/RM tools and LINQ do. Additionally, tools 
similar to those presented in [25] could also be used to 
validate the authorized CRUD expressions. 
Usability: tools similar to JDBC are very poor regarding their 
usability [20][21]. Our solution overcomes some of the most 
relevant aspects of their lack of usability. For example, unlike 
JDBC, our solution transforms runtime errors of getter and 
setter methods into compile errors. 
Applicability: JDBC was the main API used in our solution. In 
order to evaluate the possibility of using other tools than 
JDBC, a successful attempt was achieved with ADO.NET. 
The implementation in ADO.NET was mainly carried out to 
evaluate if the main aspects of the software architectural 
model are flexible enough to be used with different middle-
wear tools and frameworks. There were some technical 
implementation aspects that needed some adjustments but the 
final result is a fully functional security layer based on 
ADO.NET. Nevertheless, some paradigms, such as O/RM, can 
be used but should not be considered as an option. O/RM tools 
are mostly oriented to handle database tables as entity classes 
which is too restrictive to most database applications. CRUD 
expressions can also be handled by O/RM tools but that is not 
the focus of O/RM. 
Separation of Concerns: the architecture here presented, 
clearly separates the roles played by programmers of client 
systems from roles played by security experts. Security 
experts act at the level of the policy model while programmers 
act only at the level of application tiers. Eventually, for some 
organizational reasons, the two roles can be played by the 
same person or group of persons during the development 
process. Anyway, security experts can always have the last 
word by inspecting and validating the content of security 
models, which can be an automated process. 
Trustworthy: From a security perspective, our solution, in this 
current version, by itself cannot be used in practice. We 
emphasize that it is not aimed at providing a reliable access 
control. It is aimed at easing programmers work during the 
development process of client systems in database 
applications protected by access control policies. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In    this   paper    we   addressed    the   key   issue   of   easing 
programmers work when they develop source code for client 
systems of relational database applications with complex 
schemas and/or complex access control policies. A solution 
was presented for RBAC policies when programmers use 
tools, such as JDBC, Hibernate, ADO.NET. We started by 
defining an extension to traditional RBAC policies, then we 
defined the respective extension to traditional models and, 
finally, we described how to enforce policies. In our solution, 
each role comprises a set of CRUD expressions and the 
authorized actions on LDS of each Select expression. Thus, 
access control mechanisms act at the level of the direct and 
also at the level of the indirect access modes, this way 
covering the two most used access modes. A proof of concept 
based on JDBC was also presented. From it, we can realize 
that programmers are now relieved from mastering not only 
any RBAC policy but also any database schema. Access 
control mechanisms are automatically built and statically 
implemented at the level of business logics of relational 
database applications. 
Future work is organized around a key objective. The key 
objective is to design a new version where security is 
completely ensured without the need of any additional security 
layer. This work is already in progress.  
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